Publications

Submitted
B. Jack Copeland, Oron Shagrir, and Mark Sprevak. Submitted. “Zuse's Thesis, Gandy's Thesis, and Penrose's Thesis.” In , Pp. 39–59. Cambridge University Press. Publisher's Version
2019
Lotem Elber-Dorozko and Oron Shagrir. 2019. “COMPUTATION AND LEVELS IN THE COGNITIVE AND NEURAL SCIENCES.” In ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE COMPUTATIONAL MIND, edited by M Sprevak and M Colombo, Pp. 205-222.
2018
Oron Shagrir and William Bechtel. 2018. “Marr's computational level and delineating phenomena.” In Explanation and Integration in Mind and Brain Science, Pp. 190–214. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
2014
Oron Shagrir. 2014. “Kripke's infinity argument.” In Naming, Necessity and More, Pp. 169–190. Palgrave Macmillan.
2013
B. Jack Copeland, Carl J. Posy, and Oron Shagrir. 2013. “Computability: Turing, gödel, church, and beyond.” In Computability, Pp. 1–362. The MIT Press. Abstract
In the 1930s a series of seminal works published by Alan Turing, Kurt Gödel, Alonzo Church, and others established the theoretical basis for computability. This work, advancing precise characterizations of effective, algorithmic computability, was the culmination of intensive investigations into the foundations of mathematics. In the decades since, the theory of computability has moved to the center of discussions in philosophy, computer science, and cognitive science. In this volume, distinguished computer scientists, mathematicians, logicians, and philosophers consider the conceptual foundations of computability in light of our modern understanding. Some chapters focus on the pioneering work by Turing, Gödel, and Church, including the Church-Turing thesis and Gödel’s response to Church’s and Turing’s proposals. Other chapters cover more recent technical developments, including computability over the reals, Gödel’s influence on mathematical logic and on recursion theory and the impact of work by Turing and Emil Post on our theoretical understanding of online and interactive computing; and others relate computability and complexity to issues in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of mathematics. Contributors:Scott Aaronson, Dorit Aharonov, B. Jack Copeland, Martin Davis, Solomon Feferman, Saul Kripke, Carl J. Posy, Hilary Putnam, Oron Shagrir, Stewart Shapiro, Wilfried Sieg, Robert I. Soare, Umesh V. Vazirani.
B. Jack Copeland and Oron Shagrir. 2013. “Turing versus gödel on computability and the mind.” In Computability, Pp. 1–34. The MIT Press.
2005
Oron Shagrir. 2005. “The rise and fall of computational functionalism.” In Hilary Putnam, Pp. 220–250. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. Abstract
Hilary Putnam is the father of computational functionalism, a doctrine he developed in a series of papers beginning with “Minds and Machines” (1960) and culminating in “The Nature of Mental States” (1967b). Enormously influential ever since, it became the received view of the nature of mental states. In recent years, however, there has been growing dissatisfaction with computational functionalism. Putnam himself, having advanced powerful arguments against the very doctrine he had previously championed, is largely responsible for its demise. Today, he has little patience for either computational functionalism or its underlying philosophical agenda. Echoing despair of naturalism, he dismisses computational functionalism as a utopian enterprise. My aim in this essay is to present both Putnam's arguments for computational functionalism and his later critique of the position. In section 2, I examine the rise of computational functionalism. In section 3, I offer an account of its demise, arguing that it can be attributed to recognition of the gap between the computational-functional aspects of mentality and its intentional character. This recognition can be traced to two of Putnam's results: the familiar Twin-Earth argument, and the less familiar theorem that every ordinary physical system implements every finite automaton. I close with implications for cognitive science. Computational functionalism is the view that mental states and events - pains, beliefs, desires, thoughts and so forth - are computational states of the brain, and so are defined in terms of “computational parameters plus relations to biologically characterized inputs and outputs” (1988:7).